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ABSTRACT 
Protecting sensitive information from unauthorized disclosure 
is a major concern of every organization. As an organization’s 
employees need to access such information in order to carry 
out their daily work, data leakage detection is both an 
essential and challenging task. Whether caused by malicious 
intent or an inadvertent mistake, data loss can result in 
significant damage to the organization. Fingerprinting is a 
content-based method used for detecting data leakage. In 
fingerprinting, signatures of known confidential content are 
extracted and matched with outgoing content in order to 
detect leakage of sensitive content. Existing fingerprinting 
methods, however, suffer from two major limitations. First, 
fingerprinting can be bypassed by rephrasing (or minor 
modification) of the confidential content, and second, usually 
the whole content of document is fingerprinted (including 
non-confidential parts), resulting in false alarms. In this paper 
we propose an extension to the fingerprinting approach that is 
based on sorted k-skip-n-grams. The proposed method is able 
to produce a fingerprint of the core confidential content which 
ignores non-relevant (non-confidential) sections. In addition, 
the proposed fingerprint method is more robust to rephrasing 
and can also be used to detect a previously unseen 
confidential document and therefore provide better detection 
of intentional leakage incidents.   
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Security and protection 
General Terms 
Security 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most dangerous threats that organizations are 
facing today is leakage of confidential data [20]. Data leakage 
is defined as an unauthorized transfer of sensitive data from 
within an organization to an unauthorized external destination 
or recipient [48]. The financial damage caused by the leakage 
of sensitive data can be significant. According to the Ponemon 
Institute 2010 annual study [33], the average cost of a 
compromised customer record ranges from 4 to 156 USD. 
Customer private information that is leaked out can result in 
loss of reputation, customer abandonment and even fines, 
settlements or customer compensation fees. Two recent Sony 
PlayStation Network  data breaches are excellent examples of 
this scenario. The first breach compromised 77 million user 
accounts [4] and the second breach compromised another 25 
million [3]. Such an accident apparently caused the customers 
to turn to the competitors [15] in addition to Sony’s lawsuit 
[17]. 
Data leakage incidents can be classified as sourcing from 
outside or inside the organization. Furthermore, data leakage 
by insiders can be categorized as intentional or unintentional. 
The most challenging task is to identify intentional data 
leakage by insiders who may hold legitimate access rights to 
the confidential data. Two examples of such a case are an 
employee of an organization sending an email to a friend 
describing a new project she is working on or an accountant 
sending still unpublished revenue reports using some instant 
messaging application. According to the study [2] conducted 
by the Verizon RISK Team in cooperation with the United 
States secret services, 48% of data breaches in 2010 were 
caused by insiders. 
In modern organizations there are generally several types 
of digital data that can potentially be leaked: structured data 
(tables, lists, etc.), textual data (reports, contracts, emails, 
etc.), technical drawings, and multimedia (images, audio and 
video). However, the methods to detect and prevent leakage 
of each type differ significantly. The method proposed in this 
paper is aimed at detecting leakage of textual data. 
Usually, data leakage detection (DLD) solutions identify 
confidential data using the following three approaches: 
 Context based – inspects contextual information extracted 
from the monitored data (source, destination, file type, time 
stamp, etc.) with an intention to find anomalies or to match 
to one of the predefined security policy rules; e.g., sending 
source code file outside the organization is prohibited. 
 Content tagging – assigns a tag to a file containing 
confidential data and a policy is enforced based on the 
assigned tag. Content will remain tagged even when 
processed by other application (e.g., compressed). 
 Content based – detects a leakage by analyzing the content 
of file. 
In this paper we describe a content-based method that can 
be used for detecting data leakage sourcing from inside the 
organization and mitigate the intentional data leakage scenario 
specifically. 
The most well-known approach for content-based 
detection is fingerprinting. In fingerprinting, a known 
confidential document (content) is converted into a set of hash 
values. The inspected document (content) is also fingerprinted 
and compared with these hash values. Even though 
fingerprinting is a very effective data leakage detection 
method, it has the following limitations [40]. 
 Since each fingerprint is computed from a sequence of 
words (or letters), a change in one character of the 
fingerprinted text will result a different hash value and can 
therefore be bypassed by rephrasing (or minor 
modification) of the confidential content by replacing all 
characters ‘O’ to digits ‘0’, for example. In order to 
overcome this problem, existing DLD solutions create 
fingerprints of each confidential file with each modification 
or combination of few modifications, but this solution is 
very limited. 
 Usually, the whole content of a document fingerprinted, 
including standard content (disclaimers, standard form, 
common phrases, etc.) This may result in false alarms, 
when the standard content appear in outgoing document. 
An example can be seen in Figure 1. Current DLD systems 
handle this problem by manually managing a whitelist of 
such content, but this requires a lot of human resources. 
Fingerprinting is extensively used in plagiarism detection 
[38], [24], [6], finding near-duplicate files [30], [26], [29] and 
authorship detection [1]. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, there are no academic studies related to the 
application of fingerprinting to data leakage detection. Data 
leakage detection is closely related to the above mentioned 
problems and therefore fingerprinting methods are also 
appropriate for detecting leakage of confidential data. 
However, due to the following special properties of the DLD 
domain fingerprinting should be adjusted: 
 In the DLD domain two sets of document can be used - 
confidential and non-confidential. When existing 
fingerprinting methods are applied to data leakage 
detection domain the non-confidential document set is 
overlooked. Nevertheless, considering both sets of 
documents may add necessary information for the process 
of distinguishing between confidential and non-confidential 
content, thus reducing false alarms count. 
 The documents in the confidential document set usually 
relate to a limited number of pre-specified topics, providing 
the ability to detect previously unseen confidential content 
by classifying it to one of those topics. 
 To assure the feasibility of the DLD method, it should be 
sufficiently efficient to allow examining documents at real-
time, as opposed to plagiarism detection, for example, that 
can be performed offline. 
We propose a straightforward extension to the 
fingerprinting approach that enables extraction of fingerprints 
from the core confidential content while ignoring non-
relevant (non-confidential) parts of a document. In addition, 
the proposed fingerprint method is more robust to rephrasing 
and can even be used to detect a previously unseen 
confidential document (which is actually not the main purpose 
of the proposed method), and therefore provide better 
detection of intentional leakage incidents. The proposed 
method is simple and easy to apply and yet outperforms the 
state-of-the-art fingerprint methods. 
It is common practice to use n-grams as features for 
representing documents [8], [24], [38]. We use k-skip-n-gram 
which is an n-gram with up to k “skips” between its elements 
(referred to as skip-grams) [19]. Skip-grams were previously 
used in domains that require robustness to noise in the data, 
such as speech recognition [32], language modeling [19], 
plagiarism detection [21], and automatic evaluation of text 
summaries [44]. Furthermore, we sort the words in each skip-
gram in alphabetic order. 
These changes increase the robustness of fingerprinting to 
rephrasing. When some of the words are replaced by 
synonyms and/or the order of words in the sentence is 
changed, the confidential content can still be detected using 
sorted skip-grams. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed 
method is the first to use skip-grams for text fingerprinting. 
In order to reduce the amount of non-confidential content 
within a document fingerprint, only skip-grams that appear in 
less than m non-confidential documents are considered as 
features for a document’s fingerprint. 
Therefore, the main contribution of this paper is the 
presentation of an extended version of full fingerprinting [24] 
that is more robust to the rephrasing of confidential content 
and can filter non-relevant (non-confidential) parts of a 
document. We present an evaluation of the proposed method 
and illustrate its superiority over the full fingerprinting 
approach while maintaining acceptable execution time. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 
we introduce basic definitions. In section 3 we survey popular 
content-based data leakage detection approaches. In section 4 
we describe in detail a new fingerprinting method for data 
leakage detection. In section 5 we present preliminary 
evaluation results of the proposed method and its comparison 
with the well-known full fingerprinting method [24]. Section 
6 concludes the paper. 
 
Figure 1. Standard content illustration. 
2. DEFINITIONS 
We introduce some definitions for the types of data leakage 
challenges that content-based DLD method should be able to 
handle. 
Given a document d with content Td and a set of 
confidential documents S: 
 Full duplicate detection (           ) – exact copy of 
confidential document.  
 Near duplicate detection (           ) – confidential 
document with a small number of differences.  
Fingerprinted confidential 
document 
Outgoing document 
Irene, 
What is the status of the pilot 
timelines? Last week you 
mentioned that you were 
waiting for Henry to send you 
the development timeline for 
the pilot, and that you were 
working on communication and 
planning documents (including 
timelines) for the pilot. Your 
assistance in expediting this 
information would be 
appreciated.  
Thank you as always for your 
cooperation. 
John Smith 
T: +111.51.23989132  
F: +111.51.23989133  
E: john@company.com  
http://www.company.com 
Hi Jack, 
Do you want to play poker 
tomorrow night at my place? 
John Smith 
T: +111.51.23989132  
F: +111.51.23989133  
E: john@company.com  
http://www.company.com 
 Partial duplicate detection (                 
        ) - small portions of confidential text are 
embedded in a larger, non-confidential text. 
 Rephrased text segment detection (             
            ) - small portions of modified (rephrased) 
confidential text are embedded in a larger, non-confidential 
text Detection. 
 Previously unseen text detection (                  ) – 
previously unseen confidential document. 
 Standard content handling (                is not 
confidential) - ignore non-confidential content (disclaimers, 
standard forms, common phrases, etc.), in spite of its 
presence within confidential documents. 
3. CONTENT-BASED DATA LEAKAGE 
DETECTION 
There are a few popular content-based approaches that are 
used for detecting data leakage in outgoing information [40], 
[46]: 
 Global filters - concerning the whole file: 
o File-based binary signature – hash value of the whole 
file. Can detect only an exact copy of a confidential file. 
o Text-based binary signature – hash value of textual 
content of file. Offers more robustness compared to 
previous method. Can detect converted files e.g., txt to 
doc. Ignores text metadata like font, color, etc. 
 Tokens - concerning special keywords or patterns: 
o Keywords filter – used to build a policy based on 
keywords. For example, block files that mention 
“Project X". 
o Pattern recognition – can block documents containing a 
match to a credit card number, phone number, etc. 
 Machine learning – can detect previously unseen 
confidential documents. Machine learning methods classify 
the documents according to their similarity to confidential 
or non-confidential documents. 
 Textual fingerprint – can detect full, near, and partial 
duplicates of confidential documents. 
Table 1 presents a comparison of the detection abilities of 
each method. 
Global filters suffer from very low robustness e.g., even if 
a single character is replaced in a file, it cannot be detected. 
Token-based filters require a very accurate selection of 
keywords and patterns, which is not a realistic option in most 
cases. Machine learning (ML) methods require a lot of 
documents for training and suffer from high false positive 
rates. Additionally, ML methods cannot detect a partial 
duplicate of a confidential document since most of the 
document content is non-confidential and ML is based on 
statistics. Therefore, for content-based data leakage detection, 
the most natural choice is textual fingerprint. It is an efficient 
and effective approach and is commonly used by leading 
commercial DLD products; although, it also has some 
limitations as explained later in the section. 
A fingerprint of a document is a set of hash values of its 
features. In order to check whether document d is similar to 
one of the documents in a reference set R (when fingerprint is 
applied to data leakage detection, the set R consists of the 
confidential documents of the organization) indexing and 
detection phases are required. A pre-processing (indexing) 
phase is applied where each of the documents in R is 
fingerprinted. The fingerprints are stored in a special database 
(Figure 2). Then, during the detection phase, a fingerprint of 
the examined document d is extracted and is compared with 
fingerprints in the database. A list of documents that contain 
each of the hashes that are included in the fingerprint of 
document d is efficiently retrieved (using inverted index) 
from the database. The documents that share a number (above 
some predefined threshold) of hashes with d are considered as 
similar. Therefore, there is no need to make a pairwise 
comparison of each document in R with d and the process 
time is linear to the length of d. This property makes 
fingerprinting highly scalable. As a case in point, Google’s 
crawler employs their fingerprinting implementation to detect 
near duplicate web pages, while the reference set is the part of 
the Internet  that Google is indexing [31]. Thus, it is naturally 
appropriate for real time environment. 
Table 1. Comparison of content-based methods 
appropriate for data leakage detection. 
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Full 
Duplicate 
✓ ⍻ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Near 
Duplicate 
✗ ⍻ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Partial 
Duplicate 
✗ ⍻ ✗ ✓ ✗ ⍻ ✓ ✓ 
Rephrased 
Text 
Segment 
✗ ⍻ ✗ ⍻ ✗ ⍻ ⍻ ✓ 
Previously 
Unseen 
Text 
✗ ⍻ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ⍻ 
Standard 
Content 
Handling 
✓ ✓ ⍻ ✗ ⍻ ✗ ⍻ ✓ 
✓- effective solution ⍻-partial solution ✗- not appropriate 
Most fingerprinting techniques select only a small subset 
of the fingerprinted document's terms in order to minimize the 
fingerprints database size without significantly affecting the 
accuracy. Surprisingly, it turns out that in some cases, 
considering many (or even all) terms of a document for its 
fingerprint does not improve the accuracy, possibly due to 
noise (stopwords, tags, etc.) [24]. Therefore, fingerprinted 
terms should be carefully selected for an optimal 
representation of a document. Previous studies e.g., [8], [38], 
and [22], focus on the strategy for selecting terms for the 
fingerprinting process. The following is a description of 
existing fingerprinting methods and their advantages and 
disadvantages. 
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Figure 2. Finding similar documents with fingerprinting. 
Classic fingerprinting [30], [8] [10], [38], [42] 
Literally, the term “fingerprinting”, in most cases, refers to a 
schema with the following four processing steps: 
 Feature extraction – input document is split into tokens 
(characters, words, sentences, etc.) Then, text pre-
processing techniques (stemming, stopwords removal, etc.) 
are applied. The influence of different techniques when 
fingerprinting is applied to plagiarism detection discussed 
in [24] for English and in [12] for Czech. 
 Feature separation – overlapping n-grams extracted from 
the sequence of tokens. 
 Feature hashing - n-grams are hashed using MD5 [37], 
SHA [43], Rabin [36] or another hash function. 
 Hash selection – the goal of this step is to reduce the 
document fingerprint size. A few selection strategies were 
proposed, the best known are 0 mod n [8] and winnowing 
[38]. Fingerprinting without this step is known as Full 
Fingerprinting [24]. 
LSH-based fingerprinting [9], [7], [13], [31], [23], [5] 
These techniques are based on Locality Sensitive Hashing 
([25], [18]) which produces similar hash values when applied 
on similar objects so that the similarity between objects can 
be estimated by the similarity between hash values. These 
methods produce a very compact representation of 
documents, but were developed with the intention of detecting 
near-duplicate documents and can hardly deal with detection 
of a small portion of shared content between documents. 
Collection statistic-based fingerprinting [41], [22], [14], 
[29] 
These techniques select terms using collection statistics. The 
main assumption is that terms that are rare in the whole 
collection and common in the current document very well 
describe the main idea of the document. This assumption 
strongly reminds us of tf-idf [27] measure from information 
retrieval. 
Anchor based fingerprinting [30], [45], [49] 
Select sequences of terms that start from one of a predefined 
set anchor words. These anchor words should be carefully 
selected to be common in the core content of a document 
while at the same time rare in document framing (ads, 
disclaimer, etc.), therefore it is better to select them for every 
specific domain. 
There are also other fingerprinting approaches, such as 
using the fast Fourier transform (FFT) to create fingerprints 
robust to small changes [39], adding small bloom filter to 
documents to allow fast similarity check [26], and a method 
for detecting documents derived from templates [28]. 
However, all of these methods are not appropriate for 
detecting rephrased confidential content. 
4. THE PROPOSED METHOD 
4.1 Background 
N-grams matching is a well-known method that was 
applied in a diverse of fields such as text categorization [11] 
and music information retrieval [16]. N-gram is a slice of n 
elements extracted from a longer sequence of elements. 
Most of fingerprinting methods represent documents as a 
set of hash values of its n-grams of terms [24] where n refers 
to the number of terms in the slice. For example, the 3-grams 
of the news title “Chinese activist appeals to the United States 
for help”: 
Chinese activist appeals to the United States for help 
Chinese activist appeals to the United States for help 
Chinese activist appeals to the United States for help 
… 
 
k-skip-n-gram is an n-gram that allows up to k “skips” 
between its elements; e.g., for the above title: 
 0-skip-3-grams: 
Chinese activist appeals to the United States for help 
Chinese activist appeals to the United States for help 
Chinese activist appeals to the United States for help 
… 
 
 1-skip-3-grams: all 0-skip-3-grams and: 
Chinese activist appeals to the United States for help 
Chinese activist appeals to the United States for help 
Chinese activist appeals to the United States for help 
… 
 
 2-skip-3-grams: all 1-skip-3-grams and: 
Chinese activist appeals to the United States for help 
Chinese activist appeals to the United States for help 
Chinese activist appeals to the United States for help 
… 
Sorted k-skip-n-gram is a k-skip-n-gram which elements 
are sorted in alphabetic order. 
The skip-grams add contextual information that cannot be 
achieved using standard n-grams since the context of term can 
be better represented by considering not only the adjacent 
terms. The exact number J of k-skip-n-grams extracted from a 
sequence of terms of length L can be calculated using the 
following formula: 
            
        
        
 
   
           
For n,k<<L the reduced number of skip-grams extracted 
from few last terms in the sequence have low effect on the 
overall number of skip-grams, so J can be approximated: 
    
        
        
  
4.2 An Overview of the Proposed Method 
The presented fingerprinting based DLD has two main 
processing phases, as can be seen in Figure 3: 
 Indexing phase – fingerprints extracted from confidential 
documents and stored into the database. As opposed to 
existing methods, the proposed fingerprinting process 
considers non-confidential documents as well, as will be 
explained later. 
 Detection phase – fingerprint from outgoing documents 
extracted and compared with confidential fingerprints in 
the database. 
Non-confidential Documents
Fingerprints DB
Confidential Documents
DOC. A
DOC. A Fingerprint
DOC. B DOC. C
DOC. B Fingerprint
DOC. C Fingerprint
Fingerprinting
Fingerprinting
Lo
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u
p
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O
C
. Q
DOC. Q Fingerprint
DOC. A DOC. B DOC. C
Indexing
Detection
Figure 3.  Proposed method’s phases. 
In modern organization, the document sets that represent 
confidential and non-confidential information may change 
each day. For example, highly sensitive information about 
new product becomes publicity available after its launch. 
Furthermore, large organization produces enormous amount 
of sensitive reports/emails/presentations which leakage 
attempt should be detected right after creation. To support the 
dynamic nature of the dataset the applied detection method 
should enable real-time performance of indexing new 
documents and changing the status of confidential documents 
to non-confidential.  In the proposed method these operations 
are linear to the file’s size, since they require only an addition 
or deletion from a database.  
4.3 Indexing Phase 
The input of this step consists of two document sets: 
 Confidential documents – the documents which contain 
confidential content (while still may have portions of non-
confidential content). 
 Non-confidential documents – the documents which do 
not contain any confidential content. 
Generally, we need the organization to correctly tag the 
input documents, but in actuality, the proposed method allows 
for a small percent of noise (errors) in tagging, making it 
appropriate for real life noisy input. 
Both confidential and non-confidential documents undergo 
fingerprinting using the classic fingerprinting schema with 
adjustments to the feature separation and hash selection steps. 
The following is a description of the fingerprint schema we 
used. 
 Feature extraction – input documents are split into words, 
while words are defined as sequences of characters or 
digits. Then, optionally, words are stemmed using Porter 
stemmer [34] and stopwords removed. According to our 
preliminary evaluation, stopwords removal usually 
degrades detection accuracy, confirming the results of a 
recent work on Plagiarism Detection [42]. Therefore, 
stopwords should be removed only when the main intend is 
previously unseen text detection. 
 Feature separation – This step is adjusted. We applied 
sorted k-skip-n-grams extraction on the word sequence 
from the previous step. The k-skip-n-grams are non-
continuous version of n-grams, where up to k skips are 
allowed. Thus, 0-skip-n-grams are equal to n-grams. Then, 
the words in the skip-grams are sorted in alphabetic order. 
 Feature hashing – n-grams are hashed using .Net string 
hash function1. The preliminary evaluation did not show a 
significant effect of the chosen hash function on the 
performance of the developed method. 
 Hash selection – This step is applied to confidential 
documents only. This step is modified so that only hashes 
which appear in less than m non-confidential documents 
are considered as a document’s fingerprint. The idea is to 
make a fingerprint of a core confidential content of a 
confidential document, ignoring common phrases, 
disclaimers, standard forms, etc. According to our 
preliminary evaluation, m should be set to 1, i.e., even if a 
skip-gram appears only in a single non-confidential 
document, it is worthwhile to filter it out of the fingerprints 
of confidential documents. However, in order to make a 
method robust to errors in the tagging of input documents, 
m should be set to a higher value. 
The fingerprints of confidential and non-confidential 
documents are stored into database. At the detection phase 
only fingerprints of confidential documents are used so when 
the indexing and detection are executed on different 
computers, only the fingerprints of confidential documents 
should be synchronized. 
The demonstration of the indexing phase using the new 
method and with full fingerprinting [24] can be seen in Figure 
4. In this example, both confidential and non-confidential 
documents talk about Barack Obama’s invitations to the 
White House, however only the confidential document talks 
about Barack Obama’s invitation of Netanyahu. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that information about Barack Obama’s 
invitation is not necessarily confidential and should not cause 
a false alarm in the detection phase. As can be seen, the 
proposed method ignores “barack invit obama” and “hous 
visit white”, implementing this intuition. As more non-
confidential documents are provided, the new method will 
better distinguish between confidential and non-confidential 
content.  
                                                                
1http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/system.string.gethashcode.aspx 
 Full Fingerprinting New Method 
Settings n=3 n=3, k=1 
Input Confidential document: 
”Barack Obama invites 
Netanyahu for White 
House visit.” 
Confidential document: 
”Barack Obama invites 
Netanyahu for White House 
visit.” 
Non-Confidential 
document: 
”President Barack Obama 
has invited the Dalai Lama 
to visit the White House” 
Fingerprint* barack obama invit 
obama invit netanyahu 
invit netanyahu white 
netanyahu white hous 
white hous visit 
 
barack netanyahu obama 
invit netanyahu obama 
invit obama white 
netanyahu obama white 
invit netanyahu white 
hous invit netanyahu 
hous invit white 
hous netanyahu white 
netanyahu visit white 
hous netanyahu visit 
Ignored skip-grams: 
barack invit obama 
hous visit white 
*Actually, the hashes of the presented n-grams/skip-grams are stored 
Figure 4.  Indexing phase example. Comparison of full 
fingerprinting with the new method. 
 Full Fingerprinting New Method 
Settings n=3 n=3, k=1 
Input “Barack Obama has issued an invitation to Israeli 
Premier Benjamin Netanyahu to visit the White House.” 
Fingerprint* barack obama issu 
obama issu invit 
issu invit isra 
invit isra premier 
isra premier benjamin 
premier benjamin 
netanyahu 
benjamin netanyahu visit 
netanyahu visit white 
visit white hous 
barack invit obama 
barack invit issu 
invit issu obama 
isra issu obama 
invit isra obama 
invit isra issu 
invit issu premier 
isra issu premier 
… 
Matches 
 
 netanyahu visit white 
hous netanyahu visit 
hous netanyahu white 
*Actually, the hashes of presented n-grams/skip-grams are compared 
Figure 5.  Detection phase example. Comparison of full 
fingerprinting with the new method. 
4.4 Detection Phase 
The input of this processing step is a document d and the 
output is the “confidentiality score” of d. A document with a 
“confidentiality score” above some threshold is considered 
confidential and is detected as leakage. 
The input document d is fingerprinted using the new 
fingerprinting method (described in section 4.2) resulting in a 
list of hashes representing the document. Then, a list of 
documents that contain at least one of these hashes is 
retrieved from the fingerprints database. The confidentiality 
score of document d is set to the maximal number of hashes 
detected in any of the documents in the list.  
The proposed method is more robust to rephrasing than the 
traditional methods, since the use of sorted skip-grams 
naturally protect from most popular rephrasing techniques: 
1. Replacing words by synonyms – skip-grams will just 
“skip” the replaced word and engine will detect a match 
of skip-gram constructed from previous and next 
words. 
2. Removal of words – since there are skip-grams with 
and without removed word the engine will find a match. 
3. Addition of words – since the skip-grams applied on 
detection phase too, there are skip-gram that will be 
matched to skip-gram from indexed document without 
this word. 
4. Changing the order of words –words in a skip-gram are 
sorted in alphabetical order, so the order of words 
within document will not affect the detection.   
 As can be seen on Figure 5, both methods received as 
input the same text segment “Barack Obama has issued an 
invitation to Israeli Premier Benjamin Netanyahu to visit the 
White House.”, that is a rephrasing of previously 
fingerprinted “Barack Obama invites Netanyahu for White 
House visit” (Figure 5). The new method detected three 
matches between these text segments, while full fingerprint 
did not detect even a single match. 
5. PRELIMINARY EVALUATION 
The proposed method was evaluated using two different 
datasets and on three scenarios. We chose to compare our new 
method with the well-known full fingerprinting method [24] 
described in Section 3. Full fingerprinting is recognized as 
one of the most effective methods for detecting plagiarism 
[24] and for near duplicate detection [47]. In this section we 
present the evaluation process and results. 
5.1 Evaluation Measures 
In order to evaluate the proposed method when executed with 
different parameters and compare it with the full 
fingerprinting method, we used the area under ROC curve 
measure (AUC). ROC is a graph representation of the tradeoff 
between the true positive rate (TPR) and the false positive rate 
(FPR) for different thresholds. TPR and FPR are computed 
using the following four measurements: 
 True positive (TP) is the number of documents containing 
confidential content actually classified as confidential. 
 False positive (FP) is the number of documents not 
containing confidential content that are incorrectly 
classified as confidential. 
 False negative (FN) is the number of 
documents containing confidential content that are 
incorrectly classified as non-confidential. 
 True negative (TN) is the number of 
documents not containing confidential content actually 
classified as non-confidential. 
The true positive rate and the false positive rate (i.e., the rate 
of false alarms) are computed are follows: 
     
  
     
       
  
     
 
To compare the effectiveness of the different settings of the 
proposed method or between different methods we compare 
the results of computing the area under ROC curve (AUC) for 
each of the methods (which is in the range of [0, 1]). 
In addition, we measured the space efficiency and 
performance of the evaluated methods. We define the space 
efficiency measure as the number of characters in all 
fingerprinted documents divided by the number of records in 
the fingerprints DB (in evaluation of the proposed method, 
only fingerprints of confidential document were considered). 
Similarly, performance is defined as the average number of 
characters per second that can be processed during the 
detection phase. 
Both methods were implemented in C#2 using .Net 4.0 
framework3 with in-memory fingerprints DB. We used a PC 
with Intel Core i5-2500K CPU and 4GB of memory for our 
experiments. 
5.2 Datasets 
Since we could not find publicly available datasets for 
evaluating data leakage methods, our evaluation was 
conducted using two datasets which we adjusted to our needs: 
 Reuter news - a dataset that was compiled from news 
articles collected from the Reuters news4 feed for a 
duration of two months. The documents of the dataset 
belong to 17 different categories ranging from art and 
culture to economics and sports and based on the IPTC 
news codes5. The number of documents in the entire 
dataset was 6,102. We chose to define the documents of a 
single sub-topic of the economics topic: “international 
(foreign) trade” as confidential. The number of 
“international (foreign) trade” articles was 310. 
 Subset of PAN Plagiarism Corpus 2010 - PAN PC-2010 
[35] contains automatically and manually generated 
plagiarism cases of passages from books obtained from 
Project Gutenberg6. In order to generate a large number of 
human made plagiarism cases, Potthast M. et al. [46] 
employed an Amazon’s Mechanical Turk7 (a marketplace 
for work that requires human intelligence). The goal of the 
participants in the task was to rephrase a given text while 
preserving the meaning of the original text: 
“Rewrite the original text found below so that the 
rewritten version has the same meaning as the original, 
but with a different wording and phrasing. Imagine a 
scholar copying a friend’s homework just before class, 
or imagine a plagiarist willing to use the original text 
without proper citation.” 
We extracted from PAN-PC-10 3,036 human rephrased 
passages which belong to 30 different, automatically 
generated clusters. The clustering should have been by 
topic, but since the diversity of the books obtained from the 
Gutenberg Project was too large, documents that belong to 
the same cluster may not share a topic in a way that is 
obvious to a human onlooker. Although the goal of this 
dataset is to evaluate plagiarism detection systems, it is the 
largest dataset with manually created paraphrases that we 
found which we could use to evaluate the ability of our 
system to identify rephrased documents. 
                                                                
2 http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/vstudio/hh388566 
3 http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/zw4w595w.aspx 
4 http://www.reuters.com/ 
5 http://www.iptc.org/site/NewsCodes/ 
6 http://www.gutenberg.org/ 
7 http://www.mturk.com 
5.3 Evaluated Scenarios 
The proposed method was evaluated within the following 
scenarios: 
 Scenarios 1: evaluating the detection of short (up to 50 
words), rephrased part (that contained the main idea of 
each document) of a previously seen confidential 
document embedded within a larger non-confidential 
document. This scenario was evaluated on the “Reuter 
news” dataset. The dataset for evaluation was created as 
follows. For the indexing phase, we used all “confidential” 
documents (total of 310) and 66% of the “non-confidential” 
documents (total of 3791). For the detection phase, we used 
the remaining 33% of the “non-confidential” documents 
(total of 1954). In addition, from the remaining 33% of the 
“non-confidential” documents, we randomly selected 310 
documents and within each file we embedded a rephrased 
version of a short part of the “confidential” document. Due 
to the lack of resources for human rephrasing we rephrased 
the documents artificially by switching every third word 
with a synonym using Microsoft Word’s8 Synonym finder. 
This process is illustrated in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Scenario 1: creation process 
 Scenario 2: evaluating the detection of short (up to 50 
words) part (that contained the main idea of each 
document) of previously unseen confidential document 
embedded in a larger non-confidential document. This 
scenario was evaluated on the “Reuter news” dataset as 
well. The dataset for evaluation was created as follows. For 
the indexing phase, we used 66% of the “confidential” 
documents (total of 206) and 66% of the “non-confidential” 
documents (total of 3791). For the detection phase, we used 
the remaining 33% of the “non-confidential” documents 
(total of 1954). In addition, from the remaining 33% of the 
“non-confidential” documents, we randomly selected 104 
documents and within each file we embedded a short part 
of the “confidential” document from the remaining 104 
“confidential” documents. This process is illustrated in 
Figure 7. 
 Scenario 3: evaluating the detection of human made 
rephrasing. This scenario was evaluated on the PAN PC-
                                                                
8 http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/word/ 
2010 dataset. Cluster number 29, containing 377 text 
passages, was defined as confidential. The testing set 
contained corresponding rephrased versions of those 
passages as confidential documents and rephrased versions 
of passages in the other 29 clusters (2,659 documents) as 
non-confidential. In this scenario we attempted to detect a 
rephrasing of the whole confidential document. 
Additionally, the confidential cluster contains a diversity of 
different topics, making it more difficult to distinguish 
between confidential and non-confidential documents. This 
process is illustrated in Figure 8. 
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Figure 7. Scenario 2: creation process 
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Figure 8. Scenario 3: creation process 
The reason that we tested scenarios 1 and 2 only on the 
Reuters news dataset is that the PAN-PC-2010 dataset is 
mostly based on novels and extracting a short part that 
describes the main idea of such a type of text is in most cases 
impossible. In contrast, the Reuters news dataset is based on 
news articles which are naturally short and it is therefore 
feasible to find short segments of text which summarize the 
main idea of the article. 
We also evaluated scenario 3 on the Reuters news dataset, 
as well as full, near, and partial duplicate detection scenarios 
(described in section 2) on both datasets; however, since both 
the full fingerprinting and the proposed method achieved 
perfect accuracy in these scenarios, we chose not to present 
the results. 
5.4 Configurable Parameters 
Full fingerprinting has the following configurable parameters: 
 Stemming – applying stemming on words from input 
document. Can be enabled or disabled. 
 Stopwords removal – removing stopwords from input 
document. Can be enabled or disabled. 
 n – number of words in n-gram. 
In addition to the above parameters, the new method has the 
following parameters: 
 Sorting – alphabetically sorting the words within k-skip-n-
grams. Can be enabled or disabled. 
 k – the number of skips allowed in k-skip-n-grams. 
 m – the minimal number of non-confidential documents 
containing specific k-skip-n-gram, so it should be filtered 
out of the fingerprints database. 
5.5 Evaluation Results 
The results of comparing the two evaluated methods are 
presented in Table 2. The table depicts for each combination 
of scenarios (1, 2, and 3) the detection method (full 
fingerprinting and the proposed method) and the 
configuration settings (stemming, stopwords removal, n, 
sorting, k and m), the following measures: AUC, space 
efficiency, and performance. It should be noted that for each 
scenario we performed an evaluation of all the possible 
combinations of parameters of both methods, totaling in about 
3000 experiments for each scenario. However, we only 
present the most interesting configurations of both methods. 
In general, the results show that the proposed 
fingerprinting method outperformed the full fingerprinting 
method for almost all configurations, achieving significantly 
better AUC, even when configured to be as space efficient as 
full fingerprinting. Despite the fact that better detection 
accuracy comes at cost of performance, the proposed method 
still provide acceptable performance to be implemented in 
real-time environment. 
In scenario 1, both methods achieved the best results when 
stemming and stopwords removal were disabled. The new 
method achieved a prefect AUC, being even more space 
efficient and as fast as full fingerprinting. It should be noted 
that in this simple scenario using k-skip-n-grams instead of 
regular n-grams has little effect on detection results. The ROC 
graphs of the full fingerprinting (id=2) and the new method 
(id=4) are presented in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Scenario 1: ROC 
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degrades it when applied to the new method. In this scenario, 
the new method achieved good detection accuracy results, 
much better than full fingerprinting even when k-skip-n-
grams is not used (id=11). As opposed to the previous 
scenario, here better results can be achieved when the number 
of skips in k-skip-n-grams is set to a higher value. The ROC 
for the full fingerprinting (id=8) and the new method (id=14) 
are presented in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10. Scenario 2: ROC 
For scenario 3, both methods achieved the best results 
when stemming is enabled. Stopwords removal improves the 
detection accuracy of full fingerprinting and degrades it when 
applied to the new method. In this scenario the new method 
achieves very good detection accuracy. Unfortunately, it is 
achieved at the expense of space efficiency. The ROC graphs 
for full fingerprinting (id=15) and the new method (id=21) are 
presented in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. Scenario 3: ROC 
It can be seen that the parameters n - (number of words in 
the n-gram), and k - (number of skips allowed) that yield the 
best AUC for each scenario are different, therefore they 
should be adjusted for each specific domain. Figures 12, 13, 
14 show the effect of n and k on AUC for each scenario. Even 
though the charts differ significantly, there is one interesting 
consistent phenomenon that occurs in all scenarios; the effect 
of n on AUC decreases with the increase of k. Therefore, 
when the properties of a domain are not known in advance, an 
organization should set k relatively high in order to 
compensate a probable wrong choice of n. In general, it seems 
that setting n to 3 and setting relatively high k is the best 
default configuration that was appropriate for most of the 
tested domains. 
In addition, we noticed that for the proposed method, the 
stemming and the stopwords removal have very little effect 
on AUC (much lower than in full fingerprinting). This is a 
positive outcome because we can save processing time by 
disabling stemming; stopwords can be removed to reduce the 
fingerprint database size without a significant impact on 
AUC. Another possible advantage of this insensitivity to the 
text preprocessing is that the proposed method can be applied 
for multi-language data leakage detection. However, this 
subject should be further studied. 
 
Figure 12. Scenario 1: AUC 
 
Figure 13. Scenario 2: AUC 
 
Figure 14. Scenario 3: AUC 
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0.90 
0.95 
Table 2. Evaluation results. 
 
Experiment 
ID 
Configuration Results 
Stemming 
Stopwords 
Removal 
n Sorting k m AUC 
Space 
efficiency 
(char./record) 
Performance 
(char./second) 
Scenario 1 
Full 
fingerprinting 
1 disabled disabled 3    0.988075 6.236 3181255 
2 disabled disabled 4    0.990827 6.181 3124342 
3 disabled disabled 5    0.985997 6.182 2978276 
New Method 
4 disabled disabled 3 disabled 0 1 0.999879 8.150 3140811 
5 disabled disabled 3 disabled 1 1 0.999896 2.608 2344703 
6 disabled disabled 3 disabled 2 1 0.999906 1.294 1458476 
7 disabled disabled 3 disabled 3 1 0.999868 0.780 1115541 
Scenario 2 
Full 
fingerprinting 
8 enabled enabled 2    0.842483 12.036 2156117 
9 enabled enabled 3    0.831987 11.820 2125230 
10 enabled enabled 4    0.765432 11.868 2100985 
New Method 
11 disabled enabled 2 enabled 0 1 0.925723 16.546 2004016 
12 disabled enabled 2 enabled 1 1 0.948979 8.445 1732869 
13 disabled enabled 2 enabled 5 1 0.954353 3.221 1053185 
14 disabled enabled 2 enabled 9 1 0.963276 2.158 756366 
Scenario 3 
Full 
fingerprinting 
15 enabled enabled 2    0.923151 16.709 883021 
16 enabled enabled 3    0.846854 16.795 883930 
17 enabled enabled 4    0.775764 17.070 874032 
New Method 
18 enabled disabled 3 enabled 0 1 0.941407 7.299 724957 
19 enabled disabled 3 enabled 1 1 0.970740 2.582 544331 
20 enabled disabled 3 enabled 4 1 0.982527 0.619 205159 
21 enabled disabled 3 enabled 6 1 0.986497 0.366 110734 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we present a modified version of full 
fingerprinting [24] that uses sorted k-skip-n-grams. We show 
that the proposed fingerprinting method is more robust to the 
rephrasing of confidential content and can filter non-relevant 
(non-confidential) parts of a document. We evaluate the 
proposed method and illustrate its superiority over the full 
fingerprinting approach, while maintaining acceptable 
execution time. 
Sorted k-skip-n-grams achieve higher detection accuracy, 
compared to the n-gram-based fingerprinting, especially in the 
unintentional leakage scenario, and in the “simple” 
(unsophisticated) malicious attacker scenario. A determined 
attacker will be able to evade the k-skip-n-grams, for example 
by encoding words; however, this is a limitation of any 
existing data leakage detection system or method. Note that if 
a malicious attacker encrypts a file with an attempt to leak, a 
common practice is to block any outgoing content that cannot 
be analyzed by the data leakage detection system [40]. In 
addition, in order to counteract this type of attack, different 
anomaly detection techniques can be integrated in order to 
provide a comprehensive protection. 
In addition, most of DLD systems contain a data discovery 
module [40]. The goal of this module is to discover un-
indexed confidential content on organization’s servers and 
employees’ computers. The proposed method may 
significantly improve the accuracy of such module, since it is 
much better in detection of previously unseen confidential 
content. 
The proposed method achieves better detection accuracy 
when configured to be as space efficient as full fingerprinting. 
However, one should consider sacrificing space efficiency in 
order to further improve results. We believe that some 
organizations might prefer to invest money to satisfy the 
storage requirements for an improved data leakage detection 
system rather than absorb significant financial and 
reputational losses caused by un-detected and hence un-
prevented data leakage accidents. 
The   space requirements become an acute limitation of the 
real life implementation of the proposed method when the 
detection is performed at the endpoints. In modern DLD 
systems, an agent installed on an employee’s computer 
requires a detection of data leakage attempts even when the 
end-point is not connected to the organization’s network. In 
such a scenario, synchronizing large fingerprints database 
between the DLD server and agent can become unfeasible. 
In light of these drawbacks, our future research will focus 
on improving the space efficiency of the proposed method, 
preferably conserving its high detection accuracy and 
acceptable performance. 
In addition, we plan to extend our experiments and 
evaluate the proposed method using a new dataset that should 
better resemble real life data leak accidents. Also, the effect of 
noise in input documents tagging on detection accuracy 
should be studied. Finally, we plan to explicitly evaluate the 
handling of standard content (disclaimers, standard form, 
common phrases, etc.) within confidential documents. 
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